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Debt and Economic Activity in the United States
ABSTRACT
This paper documents a long-standing stability in the relationship
between outstanding debt and economic activity in the United States, and
explores the implications for capital formation of several hypotheses that
could explain this observed phenomenon.
The aggregate of outstanding credit liabilities of all nonfinancial
borrowers in the United States bears as close a relationship to U.S. non-
financial economic activity as do the more familiar asset aggregates like
the money stock (however measured) or the monetary base. This stability in
the debt-to-income relationship reflects the net outcome of pronounced but
offsetting movements of the public and private components of the total debt
aggregate.
Three different hypotheses provide potential explanations for this
phenomenon. Two of these, one emphasizing taxpayers' actions and one based
on credit market borrowing constraints, carry the implication that increases
in government debt outstanding associated with financing budget deficits
crowd out private financing and hence private capital formation. The third
hypothesis, which emphasizes the portfolio preferences of lenders, implies
that increased government financing will not crowd out private capital forma-






DEBT AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Benjamin M. Friedman*
Businesses and individuals, in an economy like that of the United
States, can finance their activities in a rich variety of ways. Businesses
investing in new plant and equipment can rely on internally generated funds,
or they can raise external funds from the financial markets. When they do turn
to external sources of funds, they can issue either debt obligations or new equity
shares in the enterprise. Individuals can likewise use their own or borrowed
funds to make major purchases like automobiles, and many individuals can also
borrow to finance ordinary consumer spending apart from major hardgoods. Even
in arranging home purchases, transactions that are almost always partly debt
financed, individuals usually can choose what fraction of the purchase price
initially represents their own equity. In principle, businesses and individuals
are continually making these and other financing choices on the basis of yield
comparisons, credit availability, and other considerations, so that the total
amount of debt financing does not necessarily have to bear any close relationship
to the underlying economic activity.
In fact, however, the relationship between outstanding debt and economic
activity in the United States is remarkably steady —indeed,just as steady as
the more widely recognized and better understood relationship between economic
activity and money. The aggregate outstanding indebtedness of all nonfinancial
borrowers in the United States has been approximately $1.40 for each $1.00 of
the economy's gross national product, ever since World War II. Throughout the
postwar period the overall debt—to—income ratio has displayed neither trend nor
cyclical variation.
Moreover, the stability of the U.S. economy's outstanding debt in relation—2—
to its income has not merely represented the stability ofa sum of stable parts,
as is apparently the case (apart from trend) among the familiarmonetary aggre-
gates. Neither private-sector debt nor government debt has borne a stable
relationship to economic activity, but their total has. In particular, the
secular rise and procyclical fluctuation in the private sector's debt have
approximately offset the corresponding secular decline (relative to income)
and countercyclical fluctuation in the federalgovernment's debt.
The stability of the debt-to-income relationship, if it is indeed a
regularity that will persist, bears a number of important implications for the
U.S. economy. The finding that debt is as reliably related to economic activity
as is money has immediate implications for the choice of monetary policy target.
It is also potentially relevant for fiscal policy, in that some hypotheses that
may explain the observed debt-to-income stability bear strong implications
for the "crowding out" of private investment by debt—financedgovernment
spending. Finally, it is especially important in the context of the current
widespread concern over capital formation in the U.S. economy. The financing
of an increased capital formation rate in the l980s, as well as theaggregate-
level risk to the economy associated with that financing, depends inlarge part
on issues underlying the debt-to—income relationship.
The object of this paper is to examine the debt-to--income stability
phenomenon in the United States, with particular attention to implications for
the financing of capital formation. Section I explains in what sense the
economy's outstanding debt is stable in relation to its income. Section II
reports on some empirical comparisons of relative stability for different
liability and asset aggregates. Section III outlines three separate hypotheses
that could plausibly account for the observed debt-to-income stability,
emphasizing the economic implications of these hypotheses, and briefly reports—3—
on some preliminary attempts to test them empirically. To anticipate,findings
thus far along these lines are largely inconclusive, so that the debt—to—
income stability phenomenon itself, while well documented, remainssomething
of a puzzle. Section IV concludes the paper by brieflyconsidering some
implications of debt-to—income stability for the financing of U.S. capital
formation.—4—
I. Debt and Income in the Postwar Period
Table 1 presents data showing the yearend indebtedness of U.S. nonfinan-
cial borrowers, as a percentage of fourth—quarter gross national product, for
each year since 1945. The first column of the table shows the total credit
market indebtedness of all U.S. nonfinancial borrowers. The next five columns
present comparable data dividing this total into the respective indebtedness
of each of five specific borrowing sectors. The tablets final column shows,
as a memorandum item, comparable data (not included in the total in the first
column) for the debt issued in U.S. markets by foreign borrowers.1 Figure 1
plots the total nonfinancial debt ratio and its five components by sector.
These data are "net" in the sense that they net out financial inter-
mediation. In other words, the data include such items as a household's
mortgage issued to a bank, or a corporation's bonds sold to an insurance
company, but they exclude any liability issued in turn by the bank or the
insurance company in order to finance that lending activity. Thedataalso
exclude debt issued by separate financial subsidiaries of nonfinancial
corporations, as well as by federally sponsored credit agencies and mortgage
pools. The data are "gross," however, in the sense that they include all
of an individual household or firm's outstanding credit market liabilities,
not just any excess of liabilities over either financial or total assets,
and also in the sense that they include one household's borrowing from
another or one firm's borrowing from another.
The strong stability of the total nonfinancial debt ratio, shown in
the top line in Figure 1 and the first column of Table 1, stands out in stark
contrast to the variation of the individual sector components. The non-
financial economy's reliance on debt, scaled in relation to economic activity,
has shown almost no trend and but little variation since World War II. DuringTABLE 1

















155.6% 103.4% 7.0%22.4% 7.0% 16.0% 36%
145.5 90.5 6.923.3 7.0 18.0 5.0
138.2 80.9 7.223.7 7.0 19.6 5.2
149.3 84.8 8.425.2 7.6 23.5 5.4





































126.6 63.7 8.1 23.5 7.4 24.1 4.3
127.8 61.5 8.7 24.1 7.5 26.0 4.2
134.5 62.9 9.725.1 7.5 29.3 4.5
136.8 61.4 11.0 25.5 7.7 31.2 4.4
133.8 56.011.325.4 7.8 33.3 4.0
133.4 51.9 11.6 26.5 7.9 35.5 4.0
135.8 50.012.328.0 8.2 37.4 4.2
137.2 49.5 12.9 28.5 8.3 38.1 4.5
140.9 48.213.528.9 8.7 40.6 4.3
143.9 46.8 14.3 30.5 9.1 43.3 4.6
141.9 44.8 14.2 30.3 9.2 43.3 4.7
143.2 43.614.430.8 9.6 44.8 4.9
143.5 41.614.630.9 10.2 46.3 5.1
145.3 40.214.731.3 10.9 48.3 5.5
141.0 36.6 14.3 31.1 11.0 47.9 5.3
139.1 34.4 14.1 32.0 11.4 47.4 5.1
140.3 33.9 14.2 33.4 11.6 47.2 5.3
139.0 32.5 14.1 34.0 11.5 46.8 5.1
140.2 30.0 14.4 35.5 11.9 47.4 5.1
141.8 29.8 14.8 37.3 12.2 47.7 5.1
141.9 29.4 15.1 37.0 12.6 47.7 5.0
140.3 27.6 14.7 37.0 13.0 47.9 4.9
139.5 25.4 14.1 37.9 13.3 48.8 4.9
141.9 24.4 14.2 40.7 13.5 49.1 5.5
140.6 27.5 13.8 38.8 12.9 47.6 5.9
142.2 29.1 13.4 38.3 12.7 48.7 6.5
143.0 28.8 13.0 38.0 12.7 50.5 6.5
141.0 27.612.437.2 12.5 51.3 7.3
143.1 26.6 11.9 38.3 13.1 53.3 7.4
142.8 27.2 11.8 38.4 13.1 52.4 7.8
Data are yearend credit market debt totals as percentages
fourth—quarter gross national product, seasonally adjusted,
at annual rate.
Detail may not add to totals because of rounding.




















































































































































































































































































this period the total nonfinancial debt ratio hastrended slightly upward,
apart from a dip in the first few postwar years, and has also exhibiteda
slight cyclicality, typically rising a point or two in recessionyears (when
gross national product, in the denominator, is weak).
The individual components of this total, however, have variedin
sharply different directions both secularly and cyclically. Inbrief, the
secular postwar rise in private debt has largely mirroreda substantial
decline (relative to economic activity) in federalgovernment debt, while
cyclical bulges in federal debt issuance have mostly had theircounterpart in
the abatement of private borrowing. Households have almostcontinually increased
their reliance on debt in relation to their nonfinancialactivity throughout
this period. Both corporations and unincorporated businesses havealso
issued steadily more debt, on a relative basis,except for temporary retrench-
ments during recession years. State and localgovernments steadily increased
their relative debt issuing activity during the l950s and1960s, but just as
steadily reduced it during the l970s. Except only for 1975-76 and 1980, the
federal government has reduced its debt ratio inevery year since 1953, although
this relative debt reduction has been slower inyears when recession has temporar-
ily inflated its deficit (and, again, depressed gross national product in the
denominator).
Although the principal focus of this paper is on the postwar experience
shown in Table 1 and Figure 1, it is also useful to considerbriefly the history
of the economy's debt ratio in a longer time frame.Figure 2 shows the size
aridcompositionof the U.S. nonfinancial debt ratio (with corporations and
unincorporated businesses aggregated) for 1918_78.2 Apart from a one—time
adjustment associated with the fall of prices after World War I, the U.S.



































































essentially no trend over these sixty years. At 143% as of yearend 1978,
the debt ratio was virtually unchanged from 142% in 1921. NonfinanCial
borrowers' outstanding debt rose significantly in relation to gross national
product only during the depression years 1930—33, when gross national product
itself not only was well below trend but also was falling too rapidly for the
pay-down of debt to keep pace.3 Otherwise the economy's total nonfinancial
debt ratio remained roughly steady throughout this period, and the postwar
stability therefore appears to be in large part a continuation of a pattern
that dates back at least to the 1920s.—7—
II. Comparative Stability 1\nalysis
In order to determine that a relationship is stable, it is important
to have at hand some benchmark for comparative purposes.In other words,
if the debt-to-income relationship is to be judged "stable," then stable in
comparison to what? Table 2 indicates five liability aggregates (including
total nonfinancial debt, as shown in ratio form in Table 1 and Figure 1) and
five asset aggregates used for such comparative purposes in a series of tests
of the stability of each of these aggregates in relation to U.S. economic
activity during l953—78. In brief, the results of these tests are asfollows:5
Comparison of Ratios. Table 1 shows the ratio of the U.S. economy's
total nonfinancial debt to gross national product. One form of relative stabil-
ity test is simply to compare the variability of this ratio over time, as
measured by its coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by the
mean), with that of analogous ratios for other liability or asset aggregates.
As the first and third columns of Table 3 show, this comparison for data
including time trends indicates that total net assets and total nonfinancial
debt are (in that order) the most stable, while the Ml money stock and the
monetary base (in that order) are the least stable, among the ten aggregates.
The corresponding comparison for detrended data, shown in the adjacent columns
of Table 3, again indicates that total net assets is the most stable aggregate
in relation to gross national product, with total debt and total nonfinancial
debt, respectively, a close second and third. The monetary base exhibits
the least stability on a detrended basis, with private nonfinancial liabilities
and the Ml money stock close behind. Orderings based on annual data are essen-
tially the same as those based on quarterly data.
Nominal Income Regressions. Simple ratios of precisely contemporaneous






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the relationship among variables that move over time with somegeneral lead
or lag pattern between them. A second relative stability test therefore
involves estimating ten regression equations, in each case relating thegrowth
of nominal gross national product to a movingaverage of the growth of one of
the ten financial aggregates listed in Table 3, plus a movingaverage of a
fiscal policy measure, along the lines made familiar by the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis. As the fifth column of Table 3 shows, total net assets
performs best in this test based on quarterly data for 1953—78, with a standard
error of 0.85% per quarter in "explaining" the historical growth of gross nation-
al product, while bank credit (standard error 0.97%) performs worst.6 Total
nonfinancial debt is about in the middle. Because the evidence indicates
at least some significant break in each of the underlying regressions at around
1970, the last column of Table 4 also shows the respective standard errors for
analogous regression equations based on data for 1970—78 only. For this shorter
period the relative performance of total nonfinancial debt is somewhat better,
equalling that of the Ml money stock.
Richer Dynamic Representations. In part because of the extent to which
regressions of the St. Louis form have been discredited by a variety of criticisms,
researchers examining the money-to—income (or, here, debt—to—income) relationship
have increasingly turned to methods that allow for a richer dynamic interaction
between money and income by relating the variation of income not to the entirety
of the variation of money but only to that part of it which cannot already
be deduced either from the past history of money itself or from the joint past
history of both money and income.7 In this context a key indication of the
stability of the relationship to income of any financial aggregate is the
behavior of that relationship following just such an innovation," or unantici-
pated movement, in the aggregate. The aggregate—to—income ratio of course rises
at first after a positive innovation, but it will then fall back toward a normal—9—
position if the rise in the aggregate induces a subsequent rise in income
(or a reversal in the aggregate itself). Both the timing and the magnitude
of the ratio's return to normal provide important information about the stabil-
ity of the dynamic aggregate-to-income relationship.
Experimentation along these indicates that, on the whole, there is
little ground for distinguishing the stability of any one of the five asset
aggregates listed in Table 2 from that of any other. The same is not true for the
five liability aggregates, however. Here only the total nonfinancial debt ratio
(again, the series shown in Table 1), and to a lesser extent the bank credit
ratio, return to their initial values rapidly andwithoutovershooting after a
shock to the relevant aggregate. What is especially interesting in these results
is the contrast between the performance of the ratio for total nonfinancial debt
and the ratios for non-federal debt and private debt (both of which are just
components of the total) as well as the broader total debt measure. Both the
private debt ratio and the non—federal debt ratio continue to move further
away from their initial values for two years in response to an innovation
in the relevant aggregate, and neither shows any significant return to its
initial value within five years —hardlya demonstration of stability. Once
federal government debt is included, however, the total nonfinancial debt ratio
exhibits just as much stability in this context as does any of the five asset
raios. Moreover, proceeding to broaden the liability aggregate further by
including financial intermediaries' credit market liabilities only results in
lessened apparent stability.
Among the various liability measures considered, therefore, these results
suggest that there is indeed something unique about total nonfinancial debt: It
is as if the Ml money stock ratio were sharply unstable, but adding commercial
bank time and saving deposits to form the M2 money stock ratio yielded stability,—10—
and further adding thrift Institutiondeposits to form the M3 money stock
ratio destroyed that stability —noneof which appears to happen. Hence
not only does the total nonfinancial debtratio exhibit just as much stability
as any of the five asset ratios in thesedynamic tests, it does so uniquely
among the various liability aggregates tested.8
Overview. In sum,theevidence provided by these three different
kinds of tests shows that at leastone aggregate measure of outstanding debt
liabilities —totalnonfinancial debt —consistentlyexhibits just as much
stability in relation to economic activity as do themore familiar asset
aggregates including the money stock (however measured).Indeed, some of these
tests suggest that the debt-to-incomerelationship, measured in this way, is
more stable thananyof the various money—to-Income relationships.Regardless
of whether the U.S. debt—to—incomerelationship is "as stable as" or "more
stable than" that for money, however, like themoney-to—income relationship
it is potentially important forunderstanding the economy. By contrast,
although the money—to—income relationship has long been thefocus of attention,
the debt-to-income relationship has to datereceived little notice.—11—
III. Three Possible Explanations
What accounts for this phenomenon? Unlike the case of income and money,
for which well accepted models of the role of money in the economic process do
suggest a close relationship on a priori grounds, what little study the role of
debt has received in the literature thus far has not appeared to indicate any
necessarily close or stable relationship to income. Explaining the observed
stability of the debt—to-income relationship therefore presents a major
research challenge.
A useful starting place for thinking about the underlying economic
behavior that could plausibly explain the observed stability of the relation-
ship between the nonfinancial economy's total liabilities and its income
is the familiar proposition that, because people hold wealth for the stream
of services (positive for assets, negative for liabilities) it provides, they
therefore maintain some approximately fixed target for overall wealth in relation
to their incomes. Each person's wealth—to—income target is age—specific, of course,
but if the age structure of the population is roughly stable over time the economy's
aggregate wealth-to-income ratio will be approximately stable aswell.9
Work to date suggests three potential explanations for a stable debt-to-
income ratio, each of which proceeds from the assumption of a stable wealth—to—
income ratio for the economy as a whole:
An Ultrarationality Hypothesis. One such potential explanation is an
"ultrarationality" hypothesis that in part recasts into stock—flow form work
by David and Scadding [2 1intendedto explain the stability of the U.S. gross
private saving rate as noted earlier on by Denison [31.Ifthe streams of
services (again, positive for assets and negative for liabilities) provided
by specific components of overall wealth are imperfect substitutes for one
another, then the same analysis that implies a stable target wealth in relation—12—
to income also implies a stable "sub—target" for each component —including
indebtedness. If, in addition, individuals "see through the shell" of gov n-
ment and corporations, as David and Scadding argued, then they will regard debt
obligations issued by the government (for the case of taxpayers) and by
corporations (for shareholders) as equivalent to their own liabilities.
Under the ultrarationality hypothesis, therefore, the observed stabil-
ity of the aggregate debt-to-income relationship has primarily reflected the
response of the private sector to movements in the government's indebtedness.
Given any variation in the government's liabilities, for whatever purposes may
be indicated by public policy, the private sector consisting of households
and the corporations that the households own will simply adjust by issuing
enough debt to offset the government's action. Yet a further elaboration
of the same basic idea that changes nothing fundamental is to view corporations
as also responding to independent objectives or influences (for example, tax
laws), and households as then adjusting their debt positions to offset the
given actions of both the government and the corporations. In either case,
the nonfinancial economy will seek (and achieve) a stable ratio of its aggregate
liabilities to income, regardless of the composition of that aggregate.
The ultrarationality hypothesis is interesting for several reasons
that go beyond its potential ability to explain the debt-to-income stability
phenomenon. From a purely behavioral standpoint it carries strong implications
about individuals' perceptions and about familiar aspects of wealth holding. In
addition, as David and Scadding have pointed out, it implies that people regard
as close substitutes personal saving and corporate saving, as well as personal
consumption and taxes. Hence "crowding out ex ante" renders fiscal policy
impotent in both the short and the long run.
A Capital Leveraging Hypothesis. A second potential explanation is a—13—
"capitalleveraging" hypothesis that emphasizes credit market imperfections
and the need of most would-be borrowers to provide some kind of collateral,
explicit or implicit, in order to obtain credit. To the extent that people
do not see through the shell of government, or that the distribution of tax
liabilities and the distribution of bond holdings overlap only weakly, the
private sector's assets (after netting out inside debt) consist of tangible
assets —includingnot only corporate assets like plant and equipment but also
residential real estate and consumer durables —plus government bonds. If
people have not only a stable target for net wealth but also a stable sub—
target for total assets in relation to income, then they will vary their
holdings of tangible assets so as to offset variations in the government's
outstanding indebtedness. Variations in the private sector's holdings of tan-
gible assets also typically affect its borrowing capacity, however. When
collateral constraints are binding, the increase in tangible asset holdings
that follows as a consequence of a reduction in the government's indebtedness
therefore facilitates a corresponding increase in the private sector's out-
standing liabilities.
The importance of credit market constraints is most readily apparent in
the household sector's debt arrangements. In fact, borrowing against tangible
assets in the form of home mortgage and consumer installment credit has
constituted the overwhelming majority of the household sector's credit market
indebtedness at least since World War II (89% as of yearend 1980). Similarly,
the borrowing of many corporations consists primarily of explicitly secured
long—termmarket debt, in the form of mortgages or "first mortgage" bonds,and
implicitly securedshort—term bank debt matched by inventory holdings.
Ifcreditmarket collateral constraints restrict the private sector's
abilityto substitute its own liabilities in place of the government's declining—14—
indebtedness, the private sector can increase its outstanding liabilities only
to the extent that it is also accumulating more tangible assets with which to
back them. Under the capital leveraging hypothesis, therefore, the stability
of the U.S. nonfinancial debt ratio has reflected in the first instance
an increase in tangible assets in approximately the proportion necessary to
hold the private sector's net worth fixed in relation to income, as its owner-
ship of government liabilities has declined relative to income. By easing the
effective credit market constraints, this relative increase in tangible assets
facilitates the increase in private-sector liabilities. If private liabilities
increase fully in step with tangible asset holdings, while tangible assets
increase in step with the reduction in government debt, then total nonfinancial
debt (private plus government) will remain stable in relation to income.
The capital leveraging hypothesis also bears a number of potentially
interesting implications apart from any connection to the stable debt—to—
income relationship. Probably the most important of these is the picture
it provides of the importance of collateral constraints in the everyday work-
ing of the credit markets. In addition, it implies that the government's
deficit is a major determinant of the economy's physical investment. Unlike
the case of the ultrarationality hypothesis, however, there is no necessary
connection between consumption and taxes, so that fiscal policy can affect
not just the composition of income but also its total.
An Asset Demand Hypothesis. Finally —atleast with respect to work
done thus far —athird potential explanation is that the appearance of
stability in the economy's liability issuing behavior is merely a consequence
of balance—sheet identities and market-clearing conditions imposed on stable
asset holding behavior. If the separate streams of services provided by
tangible assets and financial assets are imperfect substitutes, then people—15—
will have stable sub—targets in relation to income for the two asset classes
separately. In other words, the demand for financial assets, given income,
will be relatively interest inelastic. Since total financial assets held
must equal total financial assets issued, however, the combination of inelas-
tic demand and an at least partly elastic supply will also result in a stable
relationship between income and total financial assetsissued.1°
The most interesting implications of the resulting "asset demand"
hypothesis concern the role of equities in asset holders' portfolios, and the
nature of financial intermediation. Because what is stable in relation to
income is outstanding debt liabilities of nonfinancial borrowers, a stable
demand for total financial assets is, in the end, not a sufficient explanation
after all. In addition, it is necessary to posit not only that investors treat
debt and equity securities as only weakly substitutable —anassumption that
in turn bears importantly on the debate about the "ex post crowding out" of
private spending by debt—financed fiscal policy —butalso that, in holding
debt obligations issued by an intermediary, investors look through the shell
of the intermediary too.11
Test Results. Efforts thus far to test these three potential explanations
for the stable debt—to-income relationship, using data for the U.S. household
and nonfinancial corporate business sectors, have not produced conclusive
results.
Perhaps the strongest statement possible on the basis of these results
is that the capital leveraging hypothesis is clearly not the entire answer. As
Figure 3 shows, neither individuals nor nonfinancial business corporations
have on balance increased their indebtedness merely in pace with their ownership
of tangible assets. During 1947-66 for individuals, and during 1957—73 for


























































































































































































Tests do, however, reveal at least some positive evidence consistent
with each of the three hypotheses.12 For example, the dynamicrelationship
between the federal and non—federal components of the total nonfinancial
debt—to—income ratio shows a distinct tendency for the non-federal debt ratio
to fall in relation to a positive innovation (in the sense described in Section Ti)
in the federal debt ratio, after a delay of about oneyear. Conversely, a
positive innovation in the non—federal debt ratio causes the federal debt ratio
to fall, essentially without delay. In a study of the three-way interaction
among federal debt, corporate debt and corporate tangible asset holdings, a
positive innovation in the federal debt ratio immediately reduces corporate
tangibleassets and corporate indebtedness relative to income, thereby lending
support to the capital leveraging hypothesis. In an analogous study for the
householdsector, a positive innovation in the federal debt ratio immediately
reduces household tangible assets relative to income, but the associated reduc-
tion of household indebtedness follows only after a puzzling delay of twoyears.
Overall, although (at least) three different explanations are available
for the observed stability of the debt-to-income relationship in the United
States, the evidence now at hand is insufficient to choose among them. The
debt-to-income phenomenon remains for the present a major puzzle. In light
of its potential importance, finding the right explanation is an objective
that clearly warrants further research.—17—
IV. ications for Debt and EquityFinancing of Capital Formation
Anincreased rate of capital formation hasemerged as a nearly undisputed
objective of U.s. economic policy for thel980s. Dissatisfaction with the U.S.
economy's poor productivity performance in the1970s, as well as with the
erosion of international competitivenessthat began much earlier but also
became more evident in the l970sas the international exchange value of the
dollar declined dramatically, has elevatedwhat was once largely a business
interest into a much more widely sharedgoal. In today's environment groups
representing labor and consumers also recognize the needfor capital investment
to create jobs and to raiseproductivity and hence the population's overall
standard of living. On the whole, publicdiscussion has moved from whether
more capital formaEion is desirable to whatpolicies can best achieve it.
An important aspect of capital formation thatthis discussion has
often overlooked, however, is itsexplicitly financial side. In an economy
like that of the United States, eachdecision to create more physical capital
necessarily has a financial counterpart. Moreover, thefinancial transactions
associated with capital formation are notmerely a reflection of real resource
allocations that would necessarily come aboutin any case. The setting in
which the financing of capital formationtakes place can also be a key deter-
minant of real resource allocations,including not only the total amount of
capital formation undertaken but also itscomposition. The financial and the
nonfinancial elements of the process jointlydetermine one another, and public
policy can affect the ultimate outcome byinfluencing either.
It is also important to recognize that businessesand individuals in
the U.S. economy have in fact beenundertaking more capital formation rather
than less, at least in the usualsense of investment in plant and equipment.































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































expenditures on plant and equipment actually increased as a share of the nation's
gross national product. More importantly, however, while gross capital formation
has represented a progressively larger share of total output, the corresponding
net capital formation underwent a sharp reversal within this period. As the
second column of the table shows, net U.S. investment in plant and equipment
(that is, net of the true economic depreciation) rose rapidly as a share of
total output between the late l950s and the late 1960s, but then fell back
almost as rapidly by the late 1970s.
Still, it is gross capital outlays that the businesses and individuals
investing in plant and equipment need to finance. Corporations engaged in
nonfinancial lines of business have consistently accounted for nearly three—
fourths of all U.S. investment in plant and equipment since World War II.
As the next two columns of Table 4 show, over the last quarter-century the
U.S. nonfinancial corporate business sector has increasingly relied on external
as opposed to internal funds (including depreciation allowances) in financing
its capital outlays.13 Moreover, as the table's final colmTtns show, corporations
have consistently raised almost all of these external funds by issuing debt,
14 andindoing so they have increasingly relied on short—term instruments.
How has the economy absorbed this enormous expansion in the corporate
sector's reliance on debt? As the discussion in Section I of the U.S. economy's
stable overall debt—to—income ratio notes, the chief counterpart of the increasing
corporate (and household) indebtedness relative to income over much of this
period has been the federal government's declining indebtedness relative to
income.
Recognition of this stable overall debt-to-income relationship raises
two important questions about the financing of an increased rate of U.S. capital
formation in the 1980s: First, if business corporations undertake sharply-19-
increased capital outlays, will they be able to continue their reliance on
debt financing if the federal government's indebtedness relative to gross nation-
al product declines only slowly (or not at all) as in the l970s, in contrast
to the rapid decline in the 1950s and 1960s? The historical experience repre—
sented by the data shown in Table 1 and Figure 1 suggests otherwise. If the
stability of the economy's aggregate nonfinancial debt-to-income ratio is
indeed a regularity likely to persist, then the corporate sector will be able
to undertake more investment in plant and equipment only if the government's
relative indebtedness falls, or if corporations turn increasingly to equity
finance through retention of internally generated funds or issues of new shares.
Second, even if declining federal government indebtedness relative to
income does enable the corporate sector to finance increased capital outlays
by further increasing its own indebtedness relative to income, what effect
will this renewed change in the U.S. economy's government/private debt mix
have on the economy's overall level of financial risk? In an economy with
highly developed financial markets, potential hazards to the sbability of the
economy as a whole arise not just from the disruptions that fromtime to time
may disturb the economy's nonfinancial activity directly but also from fragility
of the financial superstructure built around it. Although a detailed considera-
tion of the level of aggregate financial risk associated with any given further
change in the government/private debt mix lies beyond the scope of this paper,
it is clear that, without a base of presumably default-free government debt
(or private debt rendered default—free through effective monetization), each
market participant's financial assets consist simply of other market participants'
liabilities.15 Even if it is not necessary for the corporate sector to turn
to equity finance because of an inability to increase its relative indebtedness,
therefore, in the context of a sharply increased U.S. capital formation rate—20—
greaterreliance on equity finance may have an important role toplay in this
process anyway.Footnotes
*professor of Economics, Harvard University. This paper, prepared for the
National Bureau of Economic Research conference on "The Changing Roles of
Debt and Equity in Financing U.S. Capital Formation," is a part of the
National Bureau's research project on this subject sponsored by the American
Council of Life Insurance. The paper draws in large part on my earlier
research done within this project. I am grateful to the National Bureau
and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation for research support.
1. In part because of the capital export controls that were in force during
1964—74, foreign obligors accounted for only a small fraction of borrowing
in the U.S. markets throughout this period.
2. Figure 2 is from my earlier paper [5].
3. The debt ratio peak during 1918-78 occurred in 1933, the trough year
of the depression. In addition, much of the household and business debt
nominally outstanding during the depression was of questionable value.
4. It is important to exclude the pre-1953 data because of the behavior of
the monetary aggregates while the Federal Reserve System stabilized govern-
ment bond prices before the Treasury—Federal Reserve Accord.
5. The full sets of test results are reported in my earlier paper [6 ].
6. An equation with standard error of 0.85% would be expected to predict
the GNP growth rate to within two-thirds of the time. This ranking
ignores the superior result for M3 based on a shorter sample period.
7. Among the most important criticisms of the St. Louis approach have been
those of Goldfeld and Blinder [8 ), Sargent [13], and Mocligliani and Ando [121.
The methodology underlying the tests described below is due largely to
Granger and Sims; see especially Sims [14].
8. Similar tests that distinguish the reaction of nominal income between effects
on real income and effects on prices (not described in the text) show
essentially identical results.
9. Modigliani [11] provided a clear discussion of these propositions, showing
how they are derivable from more fundamental principles.
10. At the most fully aggregated level —thatis, with the government and the
private sector consolidated —therewould be no meaningful distinction
between the demand and supply side of the asset markets for purposes of
measurement. This problem is merely an example of the fundamental indentifi—
cation problem emphasized by Brainard and Tobin [1 ] and Smith [15].
11. My earlier paper [4] showed why the substitutability of debt and equity
securities is so important for the "crowding out" issue.
12. My earlier paper [6 1 included a more detailed discussion of these tests
and their implications.13. The appearance of a reversal in the latest half-decade islargely due to
the aftermath of the unusually severe 1973-75 recessionas well as
the 1980 recession.
14. My earlier paper [7] discussed these patterns ofcorporate financing, and
their implications for capital formation, in greater detail.
15. Minsky's work has typically emphasized this issue;see, for example,
Minsky [9, 10]. My earlier paper [7] discussed the resulting aspect
of financial stability as a "public good."References
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